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What is an AiTM Attack? Reverse Proxy Phishing Explained

What is an AiTM Attack? Reverse Proxy Phishing Explained

What is an AiTM Attack? Reverse Proxy Phishing Explained

An adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attack is a type of phishing where the attacker secretly sits between you and a real sign-in page, passing everything back and forth so they can steal your signed-in session. It's also called reverse proxy phishing.

Older phishing tricks you into typing your password into a fake page. AiTM goes further. You sign in to a page that looks real because, in a sense, it is. You complete your MFA prompt. Everything seems normal, and the attacker still ends up inside your account.

Our article on MFA bypass attacks introduced AiTM as one of the ways attackers get past MFA. Here's how it works in plain English, why it's effective, and what helps stop it.

What "reverse proxy" means

A proxy is a go-between: something that passes messages from one side to the other. In reverse proxy phishing, the attacker's website is that go-between. It sits in front of the real sign-in page and relays everything you send and everything the real site sends back.

Think of ordering food through someone who's quietly writing down your card number. You give them your order, they pass it to the kitchen, and your meal arrives as expected. Nothing feels wrong, because the real kitchen did the cooking. But the person in the middle saw everything.

That's why AiTM pages are hard to spot. The attacker doesn't need to build a convincing copy of the Microsoft 365 or Google sign-in page. They show you the real one, routed through their own server. The main thing that's off is the web address.

How an AiTM attack works, step by step

  1. You get an email that looks routine: a shared document, an invoice, a voicemail, or a password expiry notice.

  2. You click the link and land on a sign-in page. It looks exactly like Microsoft 365, because it's the real page passed through the attacker's server. Only the web address is wrong.

  3. You enter your email and password. The attacker's server records them and forwards them to the real site.

  4. The real site sends you an MFA prompt. You approve it or type in the code, just like you always do.

  5. The real site signs you in and gives your browser a session cookie. The attacker's server copies it on the way through.

  6. You see your inbox or the document and carry on. The attacker loads the stolen session cookie on their own device and is signed in as you, with the same access you have to your email, files, data, and company systems.

The session cookie in step 5 is what the attacker is really after. It's a temporary pass that tells the site, "this person already signed in." With it, the attacker can open your account from their own computer without needing your password or MFA again.

Why MFA on its own doesn't stop it

MFA still does its job in an AiTM attack. It confirms that the person with your password also has your phone. The catch is that you're the one completing the check, so it passes. The attacker never has to beat MFA. They wait for you to finish it, then take the result.

Most common MFA methods, including text message codes, authenticator app codes, and push approvals, can be relayed through a page in the middle.

A stolen session can also outlast a password change. Unless the session is signed out or revoked, the attacker may keep access even after you reset your password.

A real example: Tycoon 2FA

AiTM used to take technical skill. Now it's sold as a subscription. Phishing kits like Tycoon 2FA gave buyers ready-made sign-in pages and delivered stolen passwords, MFA codes, and session cookies almost in real time. Microsoft called Tycoon 2FA the most prolific phishing platform it saw in 2025 and linked it to about 96,000 victims since 2023.

In March 2026, a Europol-led operation took down Tycoon 2FA, but the technique hasn't gone away. Other kits work the same way.

How to protect against AiTM attacks

What everyone can do

  • Check the address before you sign in. A Microsoft 365 sign-in should be on a Microsoft address, not a lookalike with extra words or odd spellings.

  • Be careful with sign-ins that start from an email link, especially for files, invoices, or voicemails you weren't expecting. When in doubt, open the app or site directly instead.

  • Let your password manager be a second pair of eyes. It only fills passwords on the real site. If it doesn't offer to fill, treat that as a warning sign.

  • Report anything that felt off, even after you've signed in. A quick report gives IT the chance to sign out a stolen session.

What HENNGE Identity adds for organizations

Training helps, but AiTM pages are built to fool careful people. That's why it helps to add checks that don't depend on someone spotting a bad link.

HENNGE Identity adds those checks at the moment of sign-in. Before anyone reaches Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, or your other cloud apps, HENNGE looks at more than the password and MFA response. It checks who is signing in, what device they're using, where they're connecting from, and when the login happens. If the login doesn't meet your rules, access is blocked.

That matters in an AiTM attack because the attacker's laptop isn't one of your approved devices. With device certificates, HENNGE Identity confirms the login is coming from a device your organization has issued and trusts. A login relayed through an attacker's server doesn't arrive with that certificate, so it can be stopped before a session is ever created, even when the password and MFA are correct.

Conditional access rules add more checks on top, such as limiting access to approved networks and setting the hours when people can sign in. And when an employee leaves or a device is lost, you can revoke its certificate to remove access.

HENNGE Identity works alongside the MFA and security tools you already use. MFA confirms the person. HENNGE helps decide whether the login itself should be trusted.

Finally, plan for the session, not just the sign-in. Shorter session times for sensitive apps and a clear process for revoking sessions after a reported phish can limit how long a stolen cookie stays useful.

Takeaway

AiTM attacks work because almost everything the user sees is real. The sign-in page is real, the MFA prompt is real, and the login succeeds. The attacker simply collects the result on the way through.

MFA is still worth having. But a completed MFA prompt shouldn't be the only thing deciding whether a login is trusted. Checking the device and the conditions around each login gives you another chance to stop an attacker before they get in.

Get a free 30-minute Cybersecurity Review with HENNGE to find gaps in MFA, device checks, and access policies.

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